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Abstract: EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by ad valorem tariffs but also by the 
entry price system establishing a minimum import price. In addition, the EU applies a 
comprehensive system of trade preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is that, in contrast to 
its complexity, the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to its 
goals, i.e. protecting EU producers and creating imports from preference receiving countries. 
The comparison of import prices for oranges from extra-EU countries with the EU entry price 
shows that the former are about 40% higher than the latter on average. Also, it is pointed out 
that at least 72% of extra-EU orange imports during the EU harvest season enter the EU 
tariff free. As a conclusion, the contribution of the import regime to the protection of EU 
producers is low. 
Concordantly, the preferential entry price is not utilized by orange preference receiving 
countries. Besides, although orange quotas increased from 1991 to 2003, actual exports from 
Mediterranean countries and thus quota filling rates have decreased over the same period. It 
is shown that EU trade preferences for oranges were not decisive for the development of 
Mediterranean countries' orange exports to the EU. In the light of the low effectiveness of the 
entry price system for oranges along with high transaction costs involved, its abolishment 
should be considered. Yet, results cannot be generalized, even not for citrus fruit, as is 
demonstrated for mandarins. 
 
Helpful comments made by Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel on a draft version and financial  
support by the Volkswagen foundation are gratefully acknowledged. 
 
1 Introduction 
The EU’s import system for oranges is designed to follow two contrasting goals. On the one 
hand it intends to protect EU orange growers by the means of an ad valorem tariff and a de 
facto minimum import price established by the EU entry price system. This allows creating an 
EU market price which is higher than the world market price. On the other hand, the EU aims 
to induce orange imports from preferred trading partners by a comprehensive system of trade 
preferences. Countries which are granted trade preferences have superior EU orange market 
access compared to countries which are not covered by trade preferences, the so-called most-
favoured-nation (MFN) suppliers. Preferential market access is established by a preferential 
ad valorem tariff, which is lower than the MFN ad valorem tariff, and is in some cases 




This study focuses on the effectiveness of the EU’s import system for oranges. In particular, 
does the EU entry price indeed affect the EU import price level for oranges? Further, do the 
preferred trading partners actually utilize the trade preferences for oranges? 
The EU import regime for oranges has been addressed in several studies before. In their 
analysis of the protectiveness of the reference price system, which was the predecessor of the 
entry price system until the implementation of the Uruguay Round results, Swinbank and 
Ritson (1995: 348) find that countervailing charges were applied 500 times for all fruits and 
vegetables in the period August 1988 to August 1994, due to the shortfall of the import price 
under the reference price. For oranges, countervailing charges were induced altogether only 7 
times which may be interpreted as an indicator for a low protectiveness of the reference price 
system for oranges, or alternatively for a successful organization of the exporters concerned 
(ibid: 356). These results are in line with an earlier analysis of Williams (1986). Furthermore, 
Swinbank and Ritson (1995: 349) expected the substantial increase in the entry price for 
oranges compared to the former reference price would be "bound to result in increased 
problems in selling sweet oranges into the EU market". 
Cioffi and dell’Aquila (2004) analyze the development of major orange exporters to the EU in 
the aftermath of the replacement of the reference price system by the entry price system in 
1995. Orange exports from Morocco and Israel, the major countries exporting oranges to the 
EU in the time period when the entry price system applies and tariffs are high, are compared 
to those from South Africa and Brazil, the major suppliers to the EU when the entry price 
system does not apply and tariffs are low. The authors attribute the decrease of Israel’s and 
Morocco’s exports concurrently with the increase of South Africa’s and Brazil’s exports to 
the EU in the period 1995 to 2001 to changes in the EU’s trade preferences as well as 
modifications of the EU import regime for oranges (ibid: 175, 178). Furthermore, Cioffi and 
dell’Aquila suggest that the replacement of Moroccan and Israeli oranges by Spanish produce 
may be due to the relative erosion of Morocco’s and Israel’s trade preferences for oranges 
because of the EU-accession of Spain in 1993 (ibid., 175). 
In this paper we show that the EU market price for oranges is substantially higher than the 
entry price and hence the entry price system for this product has little effect. In addition, it 
becomes evident that EU trade preferences for oranges are highly complex. They are 
specified, negotiated and repeatedly revised for each preferred trading partners individually. 
However, findings suggest that the degree of their utilization is rather low.  
The results of this study demonstrate that, in contrast to its complexity, the effectiveness of 
the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to its goals, i.e. protecting EU orange 
growers on the one hand and creating orange imports from the preference receiving countries 
on the other. In the event of the conclusion of the Doha round trade negotiations the 
effectiveness of the orange import regime will further diminish. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes EU orange imports and import policies 
for oranges, including trade preferences, in detail. Section 3 explains the methodology and 
presents the results of the analysis of the entry price system and the preferential orange 








2 EU imports of oranges 
2.1 Trade flows 
The EU is the largest orange importer in the world. In 2003, EU orange imports amounted 
about 805,000t, equivalent to 23% of world orange imports (FAO, 2005). In addition, EU 
intra-trade of oranges, originating in the southern EU member countries Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Portugal, accounted for about 1.6 million tons, of which 74% originate in Spain. 
The non-EU countries exporting oranges to the EU can be divided into northern and southern 
hemisphere suppliers, characterized by distinct orange export seasons. The major northern 
hemisphere suppliers are the Mediterranean countries (MED
1), which accounted for 88.4% of 
total EU orange imports from January to June in the period 1988-2004, and Cuba (Eurostat, 
various issues). In contrast, the orange export season of the primary southern hemisphere 
suppliers, including South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Zimbabwe and Swaziland lasts 
from June to November (Figure 1). 
The most important MED exporting oranges to the EU are Morocco and Israel. Both 
countries’ orange exports decreased markedly between 1988 and 2004 (Figure 2). Additional 
MED exporting oranges to the EU are Egypt, Cyprus, Tunisia and Turkey, with Cypriot 
orange exports to the EU exhibiting a decrease and Egyptian orange exports a recent increase. 
The MED’s orange exports to the EU represented 72% of EU imports from non-EU countries 
during the EU harvest season lasting from November 1 to May 31 in the period 1988 to 2004.  



















Major northern hemisphere suppliers Major southern hemisphere suppliers
Major northern hemisphere suppliers: Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt, Cuba; Major southern 
hemisphere suppliers: South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Swaziland; Sources: Eurostat  
                                                 
1 The MED countries comprise Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, the countries covered by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Cyprus 







































Morocco Israel Egypt Cyprus Tunisia Turkey
Sources: Eurostat (various issues). 
2.2 EU orange import policy 
2.2.1 MFN policy 
The EU external market regulation for oranges includes a seasonally varying ad valorem 
tariff, with the highest tariff (16%) applied from October 16 to April 30 during the EU orange 
harvest season (see Table 1). In addition, an entry price system is in effect from December 1 
to May 31. In the event that the entry price is undercut, an additional specific tariff is levied, 
its size varying proportionately to the difference between the product’s actual import price 
and the entry price. The Maximum Tariff Equivalent (MTE) is the maximum specific tariff of 
71 Euro that is levied if the minimum entry price is undercut by 8% or more. This MTE is 
equivalent to 20.1% of the entry price. 
The EU orange import system has been changed substantially in the course of the 
implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round. Ad valorem tariffs for oranges were 
reduced by 20% between 1995 and 2001, and the former reference price system was replaced 
by the entry price system as of December 1995. The MFN entry price for oranges, introduced 
on December 1995, was 34.3% higher than the former reference price, which was kept 
constant since 1975. This rise in the minimum market price was designed to compensate EU 
orange growers, mainly in Italy, for the abolition of the market penetration premium
2 in the 
course of the EU accession of Spain and Portugal. Following its introduction in 1995, the 
MFN entry price for oranges was reduced slightly by 4% until 2001. 
                                                 
2 Market penetration premiums, a policy instrument to subsidize orange production, were paid to orange 
growers on class I orange exports to other EU member countries prior to December 1995 (Swinbank and 




Table 1: EU’s MFN import regime for oranges  
Specific tariff  
 
MFN ad valorem 
tariff (%) 
MFN entry 
price (€)  MTE (€/t)  in % of MFN 
entry price 
01.01.-31.03.  16.0 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.04.-30.04.  10.4 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.05.-15.05.  4.8 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
16.05.-31.05.  3.2 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.06.-30.09.  3.2 -  -   
01.10.-15.10  3.2 -  -   
16.10.-30.11.  16.0 -  -   
01.12.-31.12.  16.0 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
   
Sources: European Commission (2005a), own calculations. 
 
The substantial seasonal differences of the external market regulation for oranges imply that 
the northern hemisphere suppliers are confronted with stronger import restrictions than the 
southern hemisphere suppliers. Since 2001, northern hemisphere suppliers have to accord 
with an average ad valorem tariff of 10.9% during their main export season from January to 
June, which is significantly higher than the average ad valorem tariff of 4.3% southern 
hemisphere suppliers are confronted with throughout their export season from June to 
November. Southern hemisphere suppliers have to correspond with a substantial ad valorem 
tariff from October 16 to November 31 exclusively, amounting to 16% since 2001. Also, 
northern hemisphere suppliers have to comply with the entry price system from January to 
May, thus during almost their complete export season, whereas the entry price system is not at 
all effective during the southern hemisphere suppliers’ season.  
 
2.2.2 Trade preferences  
EU trade preferences for oranges are mainly granted to the MED, who are the major northern 
hemisphere orange suppliers to the EU. The primary southern hemisphere suppliers as e.g. 
South Africa and Brazil do not enjoy preferential orange market access. The only exception 
under the southern hemisphere suppliers are Zimbabwe and Swaziland which are allowed a 
80% reduction in ad valorem tariff since 2000.  
The EU warrants trade preferences for oranges by three kinds of instruments. A general tariff 
reduction lowers the MFN ad valorem tariff by a certain percentage for any amount of orange 
exports. A tariff rate quota (TRQ) and a entry price quota (EPQ) are both limited 
quantitatively, meaning that they are applicable only up to a certain export amount as 
specified by the quota. Similarly to the general tariff reduction, the TRQ allows a particular 
percentage of MFN tariff reduction. The EPQ gives a lowered entry price in addition to a 100 
percent ad valorem tariff reduction. 
In general, preferential access to the EU orange market might induce a competitive advantage 
for the preference receiving country’s exporters against non-preference receiving countries’ 
exporters. Also, trade preferences might diminish the competitive disadvantage of the 
preference receiving country’s exporters relative to the protected EU domestic suppliers. In 
particular, a preferential tariff may increase exporters’ profits by raising the export price. A 
preferential entry price might allow utilizing a cost advantage if the produce can profitably be 




The development of EU trade preferences for Morocco, Israel, Egypt and Tunisia is very 
similar. Those countries were first granted preferential access to the EU market under 
individual Cooperation Agreements in the 1970s in the form of ad valorem tariff reductions 
varying from 60% to 80% (Table 2). In 1986, the Cooperation Agreements were amended by 
Additional Protocols to compensate for the relative degradation of agricultural trade 
preferences due to the EU accession of Portugal and Spain. Under these protocols, ad valorem 
tariffs were lowered analogously to the tariff reduction for Spain and Portugal from 1989 on, 
but limited quantitatively by TRQs since 1991. These TRQs initially varied between 293,000t 
for Israel and 7,000t for Egypt. Orange exports exceeding the quantity specified by the TRQ 
were subject to the tariff reduction rate as established by the initial Cooperation Agreements. 
In the ensuing years, TRQs slightly increased, and in January 1993 the ad valorem tariff 
within the TRQ was abolished completely to coincide with the tariff cancellation for Spanish 
and Portuguese orange exports. EPQs were introduced for Morocco and Israel concurrently 
with the transformation of the reference price into the entry price system in December 1995. 
Thus, Morocco and Israel were not concerned by the large increase in the MFN entry price 
compared with the former reference price (see 2.2.1). Instead, the preferential entry price for 
oranges in 1995/96 was set equal to the former reference price, amounting to 74.6% of the 
MFN entry price (Table 3). It was successively diminished by 4% until 2001, parallel to the 
reduction of the MFN entry price. For Egypt, an EPQ was established in December 1996. 
Spain and Portugal had to comply with the reference price until December 1993. In the 
second phase of EU accession transition (January 1990 to December 1993), oranges exported 
from Spain to the EU had to adhere with the reference price indirectly due to a compensation 
mechanism. In the event that the market price of Spanish oranges fell below the average EU 
supply price, which could not be lower than the reference price, Spanish exporters had to pay 
a compensation, equivalent to the difference between the reference price and the EU market 
price (OJ L302, 15.11.1985, Article 152). 
Between 1996 and 2004, the Cooperation Agreements were replaced by a series of Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements (EMAs). TRQs were increased for Morocco and Tunisia and were 
abolished for Israel and Egypt. In addition, the EPQ increased significantly for Egypt. In the 
most recent agreements amending the EMAs between the EU and Israel as well as Morocco, 
TRQs were also eliminated for Moroccan oranges, and Israel’s EPQ was increased slightly. 
For Cyprus, a tariff reduction was granted under an Association Agreement in the 1970s. 
Subsequently, the reduction rate gradually increased until the tariff was fully removed in 
December 1997. The tariff preference was supplemented by a preferential entry price, levied 
within an EPQ of 48,200t and established concurrently with the EPQ for Egypt in December 
1996. With Cyprus’ EU accession in 2004, trade barriers were completely eliminated.  For 
Turkey, the ad valorem tariff for orange exports to the EU was reduced under the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Association Agreement in 1981 and removed completely in 
1987.   
Overall, total orange quotas, including TRQ and EPQ, granted by the EU to the MED orange 
suppliers amounted to 593,000t in 1991, increasing to about 939,000t in 2000, and contracting 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Preferential entry price for oranges (in commercial ECU/€ per 100 kg) 
 
Marketing year  94/95  95/96  96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05
MFN EP  27.5 (RP
*)  36.9 36.6 36.3 36.0 35.7 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 
Pref. EP  -  27.5 27.3 27.1 26.8 26.6 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 
% of MFN EP  -  74.5 74.6 74.7 74.4 74.5 74.6 74.6 74.6 74.6 74.6 
 
*RP = reference price; Source: European Commission (2005a). 
To sum up, the EU import regime for oranges is highly complex and evolved in a multitude of 
separate agreements and regulations. All MED may export oranges to the EU within the 
respective quotas tariff free since 1993. Also, orange exports enter the EU at preferential entry 
prices for Morocco and Israel since December 1995, Egypt since December 1996 and Cyprus 
since December 1997. Thus, Morocco and Israel, the largest MED orange exporters, had at no 
time to adhere with the relatively high MFN entry price. Further, the MED trade preferences 
for oranges did not erode relatively to those of Spain and Portugal until December 1993. 
 
3 Analysis of the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges 
3.1 Relationship between the EU import price and the entry price for oranges 
To analyze whether and how the EU entry price impacts the EU import price for oranges, and 
thus the domestic orange market price, the standard import value (SIV) of oranges, an 
indicator for the import price, is compared to the entry price. The European Commission 
calculates the SIV daily based on the weighted average of wholesale market prices, minus a 
marketing and transportation margin and the custom duties, surveyed by origin of the produce 
in all EU countries (for further details see OJ 1994, L337/66, Regulation 3223/94). 
This analysis is based on about 5,500 observations of the SIV for the orange exporting MED, 
including Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey, with about 600 to 1,100 
observations for each individual country (Figure 3). Each single dot corresponds to the SIV of 
oranges originating in a particular country at given date. The data set includes SIV 
observations from December 1, 1995, when the entry price system was first introduced, until 
May 31, 2005. The gaps in the data correspond to the SIVs surveyed exclusively when the 
entry price system is in effect, i.e. from December 1 until May 31. 
Figure 3 uncovers directly that the vast majority of observations lies distinctively above the 
MFN entry price. Few SIV observations lie below the MFN entry price and even less are 
lower than the preferential entry price. In particular, the share of SIV observations that exceed 
the MFN entry price is highest for Israel with 99.9%, followed by Cyprus with 98.7%, 
Tunisia 97.2% and Morocco 93% (Table 4).  
For Morocco and Israel, none of those observations lies below the applied entry price which is 
the preferential entry price introduced on December 1, 1995. This means that the special tariff 
was not at all imposed on Moroccan or Israeli oranges in this time period. For Cyprus 2 
observations and Tunisia 24 observations lie below the respective entry price. The special 
tariff was most frequently applied to Egyptian oranges with 31 and Turkey with 90 





Figure 3: SIV, MFN entry price and preferential entry price of MED’s orange exports to 




























Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b). 
The average difference between the SIV and the MFN entry price is highest for Israel with the 
SIV amounting to 158.1% of the MFN entry price and 212% of the preferential entry price on 
average, followed by Turkey, Cyprus and Tunisia. It is lowest for Egypt with 124.1% and 
166.5% respectively. On average, the EU import price for oranges originating in the MEDs is 
40% higher than the MFN entry price and about 90% higher than the preferential entry price. 
This indicates that the entry price system for oranges is largely redundant.  
To check whether this result can be generalized, two other fruits are investigated. The size of 
the difference between the import price and the MFN entry price for oranges is exceeded by 
the corresponding difference for table grape exports from the MED to the EU (Figure 4). On 
average, the SIV for table grapes amounts 199.1% of the MFN entry price effective July 21 to 
November 20. 
The situation for EU mandarin imports from the MED differs considerably. The SIV is below 
the MFN entry price (operative November 1 to the end of February) for Turkey in 60%, Egypt 
in 41% and Morocco in 33% of the surveyed cases for mandarins, although a preferential 
entry price is granted to Morocco exclusively (Figure 5). Morocco also heavily capitalizes on 












Table 4: SIV in relation to MFN entry price and preferential entry price of MED’s 
exports of oranges to the EU, December 1, 1995-May 31, 2005  
SIV < 
applied EP* 









in % of 
observations 




SIV as % 
of  pref. 
EP 
(average) 
Israel  961 99.9% 0  0%  158.3% 212.4% 
Tunisia  854 97.2%  24 2.8%  141.5%  185.8% 
Turkey  1,132 92% 90 8.0%  144.5%  193.8% 
Morocco  1,133 93%  0 0.0%  127.6%  171.1% 
Egypt  746 79.1%  31 4.2%  124.1%  166.5% 
Cyprus  613 98.7% 2 0.3%  144.4%  193.7% 
Total  5439 93.3%  147 2.7%  140.1%  187.9% 
*for Morocco and Israel: applied EP=pref. EP; for Turkey and Tunisia: applied EP=MFN EP; for Egypt: applied 
EP= MFN EP before Dec. 96 and pref. EP afterwards; for Cyprus: applied EP=MFN EP before Dec. 97; pref. EP 
afterwards 
Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b), own calculations 
 
 
Figure 4: SIV and MFN entry price of MED’s exports of table grapes to the EU, 





































Figure 5: SIV, MFN and preferential EP of MED’s exports of mandarins to the EU, 


























Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b). 
In summary, the EU import price for oranges is substantially higher than the EU MFN entry 
price, amounting 40% on average. This relationship is even more pronounced for EU imports 
of table grapes from MED. Also, specific tariffs are almost not at all levied for Israeli, 
Moroccan and Cypriot oranges. The SIV was below the applied entry price most often for 
Turkish produce, followed by Egyptian and Tunisian produce. Further, the preferred trading 
partners do utilize the preferential entry price at a low degree. Israel, Morocco and Cyprus do 
not at all and Egypt does profit to some degree from the preferential entry price. For table 
grapes, the difference of the SIV of the MED’s exports amounts about 100% on average. For 
mandarins, the MFN entry price is undercut by Turkey, Egypt and Morocco on a large scale. 
Morocco utilizes the preferential entry price for mandarins as well as tomatoes to a great 
extent.  
Thus, the EU entry price system for oranges and grapes is by and large redundant for MED’s 
exports. For mandarins and tomatoes, however, import prices are much closer to entry prices 
and the entry price system seems to have an import restricting effect. 
 
3.2 Development of the quota filling rate 
The utilization of the preferential quotas for oranges is investigated by comparing the 
development of the orange exports to the evolution of the total orange quota, comprising TRQ 
and EPQ. 
Figure 6 depicts orange exports to the EU and the total orange quota for each orange 
exporting MED except Turkey, which is not warranted an orange quota by the EU, for the 
period starting 1991, when TRQs for oranges were first introduced, until 2004. 
It becomes evident that for Israel, Cyprus and Tunisia, the total quota far exceeds the orange 
exports during the whole time period. For Morocco, the orange quota exceeds orange exports 
since 1993. For Egypt, the orange exports excel the quota from 1991 to 1996 and again 
recently since 2002. For the MED as a whole, orange exports decreased since 1991, although 
the quota increased concurrently. 
MFN entry price

































































































































































Table 5: Orange quota filling rates (orange exports in % of quota) 
  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Morocco  132  106 91 86 59 54 39 35 33 26 26 21 25 46
Israel  32  33 23 17 28 58 57 47 35 27 27 15 12 12
Cyprus  - - -  -  - - 38 25 18 16 19  21  19 19
Egypt  279  347 264  92 184 105 61 54 50 68 95 170 195 114
Tunisia  75  69 72 73 73 64 45 69 61 69 61 61 48 53
Average   130  139 113 67 86 70 48 46 39 41 46 58 60 49
   
Sources: Eurostat (various issues), European Union (various issues), own calculations. 
The corresponding quota filling rates, equal to the orange exports in percentage of the total 
orange quota, are given in Table 5. Morocco’s and Egypt’s orange exports actually exceed 
their quotas in some years during the 1990s, but fall below afterwards. Morocco’s filling rate 
has been under 50% since 1997. The removal of the TRQ in 2004 caused an increase of the 




orange exports to the EU in this period. Tunisia’s quota filling rate varies between 48% and 
75%. The rate for Cyprus is always below 50%. Israel exhibits the lowest filling rates, 
declining from 32% in 1991 to 12% in 2004. The unweighted average filling rate fell from 
over 100% in 1991 to 39% in 1999, but rose again to over 50% in 2002. 
 
Overall, while TRQs and EPQs for oranges originating in the MEDs were increasing 
following their introduction, the MED countries’ orange exports to the EU were decreasing. 
Therefore, the quota filling rate has fallen for most MED countries and the unweighted 
average quota filling rate has been 60% or less for all years since 1997. 
 
 
4 Discussion of results and implications 
The analysis of the EU import price for oranges reveals that the import price of oranges 
originating in the MED is about 40% higher than the MFN entry price on average. The import 
price is highest for Israeli produce with the SIV for oranges amounting 158% of the MFN 
entry price. In addition, the investigation on the EU trade preferences for oranges showed that 
about 70% of EU orange imports during the EU orange harvest season originate in the MED 
which are covered by a preferential tariff and enter the EU tariff-free since 1993. This 
suggests that the contribution of the external market regulation to the protection of EU orange 
growers is low. In particular, the entry price system for oranges is of little effectiveness. 
Concordantly, Morocco, Israel and Cyprus do not utilize the preferential entry price for 
oranges. This suggests that these countries do not have a comparative cost advantage vis-à-vis 
their competitors in the EU market, i.e. Spanish orange exporters. Indeed, EU importers report 
that prices of Moroccan and Israeli orange imports are significantly higher than the import 
price of Spanish oranges. Egypt is the only MED profiting from the preferential entry price to 
some degree. 
Also, the analysis uncovered that the total orange quota far exceeds exports of Israel, Cyprus 
and Tunisia at any time and Morocco since 1992. Egypt is the only MED for which orange 
exports excel the total quota during a significant time period. Overall, although orange quotas 
increased from 1991 to 2004 for the MED as a whole, actual exports declined concurrently 
and thus quota filling rates have decreased. This indicates that the quantitative limitations of 
tariff and entry price reductions within TRQs and EPQs are largely redundant. Thus, EU trade 
preferences for oranges are not decisive for the development of the MED’s orange exports to 
the EU 
Additionally, it became evident that the improvement of market access for Spain and Portugal 
due to their EU accession occurred almost parallel to the enhancement of preferences for the 
MED until 1993. This supports the conclusion that the development of trade preferences for 
the MED compared to market access conditions for Spain and Portugal was not decisive for 
the development of the MED’s orange exports to the EU up to 1993.  
Our results indicate that the erosion of orange trade preferences of Israel and Morocco relative 
to those of Spain and Portugal in the aftermath of 1993 did not cause the decline of orange 
exports from those countries. Both countries’ orange exports enter the EU tariff free since 
1993. Also, the preferential entry price is not utilized by the orange exporters of Israel and 
Morocco. Even, the average import price of oranges originating in Israel and Morocco is 
about 58% and 28% higher than the MFN entry price, respectively. Hence, any erosion of 
trade preferences compared to Spain which is suggested by Cioffi and dell’Aquila (2004: 




assumption of Cioffi and dell’Aquila (2004: 178) that the large increase in the MFN entry 
price relative to the former reference price may have contributed to the decline of Moroccan 
and Israeli orange exports to the EU. Instead, we show that a preferential entry price for 
oranges originating in Israel and Morocco, which was equal to the former reference price, was 
introduced concurrently with the implementation of the entry price system in December 1995. 
Thus, Morocco and Israel had at no time to adhere with the MFN entry price for oranges. 
Hence, factors beyond EU trade policy would appear to have caused the decline of the MED’s 
orange exports to the EU. For example, market distance and product variety are of particular 
importance for the decline of Israeli orange exports to Germany. German importers appreciate 
the high flexibility with orange imports from Spain. Due to Spain’s proximity to the market, 
Spanish produce is packed directly in nets in Spain and then transported by truck to retailers’ 
distribution centres in Germany within 2 days. In contrast, Israeli produce is first packed in 
cardboard boxes in Israel, which are transported by ship within 4 days to Marseille (France). 
The produce is then carried by truck to packing stations in Germany where it is repacked in 
nets before it is brought to supermarkets. Of course, the resulting transportation costs are 
lower for Spanish produce. Besides, Shamouti is the orange variety which still dominates 
Israeli orange production. In Spain, new orange varieties were introduced, e.g. the Navel 
varieties. German consumers prefer Navel over Shamouti oranges, but Israeli orange 
producers did not manage to adapt to this change in consumer preferences in time.   
It remains to determine the influence of EU internal market regulations and structural policy 
on the large increase in EU orange market share of Spanish produce. EU orange production is 
protected internally by e.g. processing aid and withdrawal compensation. Also, operational 
programs of producer organizations for improvement of product quality and market 
promotion activities are financially supported. Restructuring aids are granted to modernize 
marketing structure and to grub up old orange groves. Additional funds are provided by the 
EU’s Cohesion Fund e.g for enhancement of transport infrastructure. 
Finally, all this implies that the liberalization of orange trade between the EU and the MED 
countries, which could be realized in the course of the ongoing Barcelona Process, would 
induce few, if any, trade effects. Theoretically, the entry price system would prevent 
especially low qualities from entering the EU market. For oranges, however, we don't find 
evidence from interviews with trading companies for potential low quality orange market 
segments below the entry price level. Existing marketing standards for citrus fruits specifying 
minimum requirements regarding e.g. fruit size, external appearance, uniformity etc. would 
prevent inexpensive, low quality produce from entering the EU market, even if the EU entry 
price system were removed.  
Yet, as the results for mandarins demonstrate, these results cannot be generalized, not even 
for citrus fruit imported from the MED countries. It is highly probable that the removal of the 
entry price for mandarins would result in a decrease of the average EU import price level. 
Table grapes, however, provide a second example for which the SIV of imports from the 
MED is far above the EU entry price, and thus the entry price system is of little effect. 
The conclusion that large parts of the EU external trade regime for oranges are redundant will 
potentially be amplified by the current round of trade negotiations in the WTO. Negotiations 
on market access will probably result in significant tariff reduction rates which would also 
apply to the specific tariffs which are part of the EU’s entry price system. In implementing the 




specific tariffs – an approach which could be repeated and would thus further diminish the 
relevance of the EU entry price system.
3 
In the light of the low effectiveness of the EU import regime for oranges along with high 
transaction costs involved in its administration and further development, the unlimited and 
free access of the MEDs to the EU orange market could be considered as an alternative. This 
may be extended to grapes and possibly to other fruits and vegetables. In addition, the 
abolition of the entry price system for some products would reduce the incidence of a clear 
non tariff barrier to market access which has survived the Uruguay Round process of 
tariffication, but which is in clear conflict at least with its spirit. 
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